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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
IRWIN G. BUNNELL, * 
* 
Applicant/Appellant, * 
vs. * BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
* SECOND INJURY FUND 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, * 
U. S. STEEL CORPORATION and * 
SECOND INJURY FUND, * 
* Case No. 860196 
Defendants/Respondents. * 
I, STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Is there substantial evidence in the record to support the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order issued on February 25, 1986 
by the Administrative Law Judge and affirmed unanimously by the full 
Industrial Commission on March 20, 1986 dismissing applicant's permanent 
total disability claim filed with the Industrial Commission of September 
16, 1985 alleging that applicant's disabling pulmonary problems resulted 
from an industrial injury of November 13, 1953. 
2. Was applicant denied his right to a fair and unbiased hearing? 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a worker's compensation claim for total disability 
benefits. The claim was dismissed after a hearing before the 
Administrative Law Judge. (R.136) A timely Motion for Review was denied 
by the Industrial Commission with a comment adopting and affirming the 
Findings and Conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge. (R.150) 
1 
III. DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
A hearing was held on February 14, 1986 before the Industrial 
Commission Administrative Law Judge Timothy C. Allen on Irwin G. Bunnell's 
application for permanent total worker1s compensation benefits. On 
February 25, 1986 an Order was entered by Judge Allen denying applicant's 
claim that his present complaints of permanent and total disability from 
pulmonary problems are a result of his industrial accident of November 13, 
1953. 
A Motion for Review was filed in behalf of the applicant on March 
12, 1986. On March 20, 1986 the Industrial Commission denied the Motion 
for Review and the Administrative Law Judge's Order was affirmed. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Applicant, Irwin G. Bunnell at 6:45 a.m. on November 13, 1953 was 
working as a carpenter doing repair work on the number 6 open hearth 
furnace at U. S. Steel's Geneva Works when he lost his footing and fell 
approximately 15 feet to the furnace floor. According to testimony at the 
hearing some 32 years later, fellow workers reached him within a matter of 
seconds and within 30 to 40 seconds fellow workers had applicant lifted 
outside the furnace area. (R.30) The record shows that applicant was 
removed immediately by ambulance to the Geneva dispensary for first aid 
after which he was brought immediately to St. Mark's Hospital in Salt Lake 
City. (R.108) There was testimony at the Industrial Commission hearing 
almost 33 years later that applicant was unconscious for 5 days; however, 
the admissions note at St. Mark's Hospital on the date of the accident 
(November 13, 1953) clearly indicates otherwise. (R.92) In any event, he 
remained at the St. Mark's Hospital in Salt Lake City for almost 2 weeks 
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before being discharged on November 28, 1953. (R.94) According to 
medical records he to continued to improve and was returned to light work 
at his full former earnings effective January 14, 1954. He continued on 
light work status at full earnings although testimony at the 1986 hearing 
suggested that to some extent he was being "carried** by fellow employees 
at the Geneva open hearth. (R.26) In any event on July 29, 1954 he was 
released for regular work at his former occupation of carpenter and he 
remained at that job performing the full extent of the duties for 14 
additional years until he retired in 1968 at the normal retirement age of 
65. In 1985, almost 17 years later, applicant filed with the Utah 
Industrial Commission his claim for permanent total disability due to 
pulmonary problems which he alleged resulted from his 1953 fall at the 
Geneva open hearth. All available medical records were provided to the 
Administrative Law Judge and the Commission and testimony was taken at the 
hearing from the applicant (now 83 years of age), his wife, a fellow 
employee who retired even prior to applicant's leaving U. S. Steel and a 
neighbor who claimed have grown up with the applicant. The record also 
revealed (R.5) that applicant was paid temporary total disability benefits 
for his 60 days temporary total disability at the rate (maximum) of 
$28,875 per week, that he was paid 15% permanent partial disability at the 
same rate totalling $866.25 and that he retired on September 30, 1969 one 
month prior to his 66th birthday on a normal longevity retirement at a 
monthly pension of $143.52 which was in excess of the maximum permanent 
total disability rate applicant could have received had he been drawing 
permanent total disability. 
The Administrative Law Judge reviewed the entire record including 
additional medical reports submitted by counsel for the applicant and 
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concluded that the applicant had failed to sustain the burden which was 
his to show the necessary causal relationship between claimant's ultimate 
pulmonary disability and his open hearth fall injury of 1953. Likewise, 
the full Industrial Commission, upon Motion for Review reviewed the entire 
record (R.150) and concluded that the Motion for Review should be denied 
and the Order of the Administrative Law Judge affirmed. On April 15, 1986 
applicant filed his Petition for Writ of Review with this Court on April 
15, 1986. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the 
Industrial Commission's finding that plaintiff did not meet his 
burden to show by a preponderance of the medical evidence that his 
permanent total disability from pulmonary problems was a residual 
result of his industrial accident of November 13, 1953. 




THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION WHICH DENIED WORKER'S COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS TO PLAINTIFF MUST BE UPHELD IF THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS ARE 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The standard of review exercised by this Court in cases appealing 
decisions of the Industrial Commission is well established. In Hiftftins vs. 
Industrial Commission 700 P.2d 704, 706 (Utah 1985) this Court stated: 
Our standard for review of the Industrial Commission's Findings of 
Fact in workmen's compensation cases is well-settled. We are 
limited to determining whether the Commission's findings are 
supported by substantial evidence. Kennecott vs. Industrial 
Commission, Utah, 675 P.2d 1187, 1192 (1983); Kent vs. Industrial 
Commission. 89 Utah 381, 385, 57 P.2d 724, 725, (1936). 
This standard was reaffirmed in such recent cases as Hardman vs. Salt Lake 
City Fleet Management, 41 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (September 8, 1986) and Biftfoot's 
Inc. vs. Industrial Commission, 28 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (February 26, 1986) in 
which case this Court stated also that where the evidence is in conflict "this 
Court has no power to determine the weight of the evidence and credibility of 
the witnesses under the Statute.** Staker vs. Industrial Commission, 61 Utah 
11, 209 P.880 (1922). 
POINT II 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE 
COMMISSION. 
The Commission relied upon the extensive medical evidence in the record to 
support its findings and decision. Analysis of the medical evidence makes it 
clear beyond question that finding plaintiff's disabling pulmonary problems to 
be a residual result of his November 13, 1953 industrial accident is not the 
only inevitable conclusion from the evidence. In fact the medical evidence is 
for the most part directly to the contrary and does not even suggest such an 
"inevitable conclusion". In the first place, despite contrary testimony at 
the hearing almost 33 years later by plaintiff and his witnesses, the medical 
record fails to disclose any pulmonary complaints on the part of plaintiff 
until 1968 almost 15 years following the injury, when reference is made in a 
report by Dr. Bigelow (R.120) to the effect that "this is a 64 year old man 
who comes in for investigation of a cough which has been going on for over a 
year but last six weeks, much worse." Dr. Boyd Larsen U. S. Steel's physician 
at Geneva reported for the first time (R.116) on August 30, 1968 that 
plaintiff had "cough for about a month". Likewise Dr. E. A. White attending 
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physician on November 16, 1968 reports (R.127) "approximately five months ago 
he developed a cough which has been progressively more productive. . .*' and 
further refers to his industrial accident of 1953 and one subsequent pneumonia 
"but following this and for the last 16 years up until earlier this year he 
has had no chest complaints." (R.127) The pathologic diagnosis at that time 
(R.128) was moderate, chronic bronchitis, benign. Of interest also is the 
discharge diagnosis of Dr. Bigelow (R.131) of: 
Chronic congestive failure with pulmonary congestion. 
Old pulmonary scarring compatable with healed granulomatous T.B. 
No calcium, but is bilateral and apical. 
Has some very minor pulmonary disease, chronic and obstructive, very 
likely has an underlying arteriosclerotic disease, but this could 
not be proved with present evidence. 
Nothing in the above leads to the "inevitable conclusion** that plaintiff's 
pulmonary problems were a result of his 1953 industrial accident. 
Likewise the many chest x-ray reports in the record do not reveal such an 
•'inevitable conclusion** or even a reasonably reliable suggestion. On March 
15, 1966 Dr. Larsen requested a "routine x-ray" (R.114) in which James R. 
Matheson, M.D., found "there is a slight to moderate degree of pulmonary 
emphysema and pulmonary scarring. The appearance of the chest is very 
similiar to that seen in 1952." Thus indicating that plaintiff had pulmonary 
indications of emphysema even prior to the November 13, 1953 industrial 
accident. Similarly in 1954 (R.102) radiologist H. J. Brown noted 
"considerable emphysema is present in both lungs and this has produced a 
barrel chest deformity.** Again on March 14, 1955 (R107) Dr. Brown notes ". . 
.chest - considerable emphysema is present in the lungs. The lungs are 
otherwise normal. . ." Also noted by Dr. Brown were the old healed fractured 
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ribs. . .with the further notation "these should be of no clinical 
significance at this time." On September 3, 1968 (R.116) notes that "lungs 
are essentially unchanged from previous film. The increased markings 
throughout lung fields are about the same. There is evidence of maderate 
emphysema and marked increase in both bases suggestive of bronchiectasis." In 
summary, the x-ray readings and reports simply do not suggest a causal 
relationship, yet alone the required "inevitable causal conclusion" between 
plaintiff*s industrial accident of November 13f 1953 on the one hand and his 
indications of longstanding pulmonary emphysema, tuberculosis and/or 
bronchitis on the other. 
Finally, the medical evidence contains the numerous reports of Dr. Martin 
Lindem U. S. Steel's chief surgeon located in Salt Lake City, Utah and Dr. 
Boyd G. Larsen, U. S. Steelfs physician in charge of the Geneva plant medical 
program. Neither Dr. Lindem*s initial report dated November 16, 1953 (R.97) 
nor his medical records summary dated March 17, 1955 addressed to the 
Industrial Commission of Utah for permanent disability evaluation (R.108) 
contains any indication of pulmonary complaints or pulmonary findings in any 
way attributable to plaintiff's injury of November 13, 1953. Indeed, both 
reports indicate satisfactory convalescence on the part of the plaintiff and 
the March 17, 1955 report shows the return of plaintiff to light work on 
January 13, 1954 and regular work on July 29, 1954. (R.108) Dr. Larsen*s 
reports are found throughout the medical record beginning with the First 
Report of Injury dated November 17, 1953 (R.90), continuing with his 
evaluation of permanent partial disability report dated October 21, 1954 
following plaintiff's return to regular duty and recommending a 15% permanent 
partial disability residual settlement (R.106) and ending with his requests 
for routine chest x-ray and report dated March 15, 1966 (R.114) which report 
indicates "a slight to moderate degree of pulmonary emphysema and pulmonary 
7 
scarring and a chest appearance very similiar to that seen in 1952, are 
consistent in their absence of any indications of pulmonary problems of any 
kind on the part of plaintiff during the 1A year period of such reports. In-
deed there is no reference at any time even suggesting any pulmonary problems 
attributable to the open hearth fall of plaintiff of November 13, 1953. Also 
significant is the Industrial Commission Order dated May 9, 1955 (R.134) 
following the examination and evaluation of plaintiff by the Disability Rating 
Board appointed by the Industrial Commission which evaluation contained no 
reference of any kind to either pulmonary complaints on the part of the 
plaintiff or any pulmonary problems or disabilities recognized by the rating 
board. Applicant's wife referred to the examination by the Disability Rating 
Board in March of 1955 as part of plaintiff's assertion that he was denied a 
fair and impartial hearing. (R.58) It was contended on behalf of plaintiff 
that he was prejudiced because Mrs. Bunnell was not permitted to attend the 
examination of plaintiff by the Disability Rating Board and that they could 
not appeal the eventual 15% permanent partial disability rating because they 
were too poor and because plaintiff "out of work and had no wages coming in at 
that time." (R.58) Such representations point out not only plaintiff's lack 
of understanding of the evaluation process on the part of the Disability 
Rating Board in which outsiders including counsel as well as physicians or 
other representatives from either the employer or the employee are excluded 
(R.61) but more significantly plaintiff's faulty recollection of happenings 
and events 30 years before. While plaintiff's wife testified that at the time 
of the Disability Rating Board's examination and evaluation in 1955, 
plaintiff was out of work and had no money coming in, (R.58) The actual 
facts were that plaintiff had returned to work with his employer United States 
Steel in January, 1954 and was earning his full salary throughout the entire 
period involved. Indeed, he continued to work for U. S. Steel for 13 
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additional years at full pay prior to his retirement at age 65 in 1968. Thus, 
the testimony is clear that there was complete confusion at the hearing on the 
part of plaintiff, his wife and counsel with respect to the 1955 Disability 
Rating Board examination which was conducted at a time when plaintiff was 
working full time and realizing his full earnings as a carpenter for U. S. 
Steel, earnings which ne continued to enjoy at even an increased rate for the 
next 13 years. Such confusion demonstrates the inaccuracies and 
misrepresentations inherent in attempted recollection of facts and events 30 
years after the fact. It also has provided further justification, if any is 
needed, for the reliance by the Administrative Law Judge upon medical records 
prepared at the time of examination in preference to testimony and faulty 
recollection 30 years later dimmed by the long passage of time and perhaps 
colored by personal involvement in the unltimate resolution of the 
compensation claim. In any event, the bottom line is that the Administrative 
Law Judge under the circumstances, clearly was in the best position to 
evaluate the conflict in the evidence and where, as here, there is evidence to 
support his findings and decision, they properly should not be disturbed on 
appeal before this Court. 
Plaintiff has placed great reliance upon the one page letter report to 
plaintiff's counsel dated January 20, 1986 by Dr. Tracy A. Hill who 
acknowledged that the etiology of the obstructive lung disease of plaintiff to 
be uncertain because plaintiff was a non-smoker and did not have a history of 
asthma. (R.132) Nevertheless, based upon his review of the medical records 
provided to him by plaintiff's counsel, he stated that it was "reasonable to 
speculate" that plaintiff's pulmonary problems originated with his injury at 
U. S. Steel in 1953. Such "speculation" ignores x-ray indications of already 
existing emphysema markings in plaintiff's chest as well as recorded history 
of bronchitis as a child (R.120) and diagnosis of possible heart congestion 
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and old healed tuberculosis. (R.121) Moreover there is some indication that 
plaintiff's pulmonary problems may have been aggravated through the years by 
his work in the dusty Geneva open hearth area. This, of course, under other 
circumstances possibly could provide a basis for an occupational disease 
claim, but as pointed out by the Administrative Law Judge, (R.139) such a claim 
in this case would be precluded under the Utah Occupational Disease Act. In 
summary, the one page letter report of Dr. Hill directed to plaintiff's 
counsel 32 years after plantiff's accident and almost 20 years following the 
bulk of the medical evidence comprising the record in this case clearly is not 
sufficient to render the Commission's findings "wholly without cause'* or to 
make such findings of the Commission contrary to the "one inevitable 
conclusion from the evidence**. At best there is a conflict of evidence as to 
the effect, if any, of plaintiff's 1953 open hearth accident upon his present 
pulmonary problems. Under such circumstances the Commission's Findings of 
Fact should not be set aside in the light of established principles of review 
clearly set forth by this Court in the many cases cited above. 
POINT III. 
PLANTIFF WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR AND UNBIASED HEARING. 
Plaintiff in his brief has gone to great lengths to point out 
rulings or statements on the part of the Administrative Law Judge which he 
characterizes as a denial of a fair and unbiased hearing. It is true that 
testimony was rejected by the Administrative Law Judge, some on the basis 
of obvious irrelevancy (R.37) and some clearly hearsay statements of a 
medical nature alleged to have been made 33 years ago by the treating 
physicians one of whom has been dead for many years (Dr. Martin Lindem) 
and the other who has been retired for some time and now is partially 
blind (Dr. Boyd J. Larsen). All of the medical reports of U. S. Steel 
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including those by Drs. Lindem and Larsen were made a part of the record 
and in accordance with established Industrial Commission procedure and 
practice represent the medical evidence of the treatment and diagnosis 
accorded to plaintiff by those treating physicians. For instance, 
testimony relating to the 3 hour delay in advising plaintiff's wife of his 
serious industrial accident was offered ostensibly to indicate lack of 
sympathy, lack of competence or negligence on the part of U. S. Steel in 
the handling of plaintiff's injury and treatment. (R.33) Upon objection 
this testimony was rejected for the obvious reason of relevance. (R.A4) 
The Administrative Law Judge also, rejected hearsay statements on the part 
of Drs. Lindem and Larsen tending to suggest a lack of feeling, possible 
incompetence or even a "cover up" with respect to the medical treatment 
and the medical records made available to the Commission when this case 
was filed some 32 years following the accident and the medical treatment 
accorded to the plaintiff. For instance the medical reports in the record 
clearly show the nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries and the 
progress during his stay at the St. Mark's Hospital and his period of 
convalescence prior to his return to light work for the employer on 
January 13, 1954 approximately 60 days following his injury. 
(R.90-employer's initial surgical report; R.91-96-reports on admission, 
treatment progress and discharge, St. Mark's Hospital 11/13/53 through 
11/28/53.) It should be noted that the progress notes on the day after 
the injury (R.93) indicate that x-rays had been taken and that "patient is 
doing well". Upon objection by Defendants the Administrative Law Judge 
rejected plaintiff's wife's attempt to tell of the injuries her husband 
received 33 years earlier and what Dr. Lindem told her at the time. We 
believe that the rejection of such evidence was entirely proper. 
Likewise, the rejection of hearsay evidenced by Mrs. 
11 
Bunnell as to why she stayed in the hospital with her husband during part 
or all of the 15 days he was at St. Mark's. (R.37) Indeed, the progress 
notes made at the time (R.93) show on 11-14-5^,". . . patient is doing 
well." The note on 11-20-53 states, "is sitting up in bed, feeling much 
better. TPR normal."; and on 11-28-53: "has been up in wheelchair. TPR 
normal. May go home according to Dr. Lindem." 
Plaintiff also complained because Mrs, Bunnell was not allowed to 
attend the examination and evaluation of Mr. Bunnell which was made by the 
Disability Rating Board appointed by the Industrial Commission in March of 
1955. (R.58) In response it should be pointed out that the practice then 
and now is not to permit any outsiders including relatives, attorneys or 
treating physicians when disability rating examinations are made. (R.61) 
It is also noteworthy in connection with the permanent partial disability 
rating accorded to plaintiff in this case that he was referred by the U. 
S. Steel medical division to the Industrial Commission for evaluation and 
rating (R.108) and further that the company accepted and paid the 15% 
permanent partial rating accorded to plaintiff by the Industrial 
Commission's Disability Rating Board. (R.13A) As part of his allegation 
of unfairness plaintiff refers to his award of $400.00 (R.58) (it should 
be noted that the actual amount was $866.25) and then attemptedAexplain 
the failure to appeal or protest the award by saying, "he was out of work, 
.he had no wages coming in.'* and further that attorneys they had 
contacted had said, "Don't try to fight Geneva. You can never win against 
Geneva." (R.58,59) Such testimony in our opinion properly should have 
been excluded by the Administrative Law Judge. In addition, the above 
demonstrates the inaccuracy of recollection attempted to be made 30 to 35 
years after the event in question. As you will note from the payment 
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award to plaintiff (R.134) it is dated on June 20, 1955 at a time when 
plaintiff was working full time and for full wages, incentives and fringe 
benefits for his employer U. S. Steel. Indeed, plaintiff continued to 
work with full earnings, incentives fringe medical and insurance benefits 
for another 13 years prior to his normal retirement at age 65 in 1968. 
Once again the facts and the medical evidence are at complete variance 
with the attempted recollection and testimony offered by plantiff and his 
wife more than 30 years later. 
As indicated above there was volunteered testimony and hearsay 
statements presented in behalf of the plaintiff which were rejected upon 
objections by defendants. Much of the rejected material suggests that the 
company and its medical staff were unsympathetic and unfeeling, 
incompetent and/or negligent, and arbitrarily unfair in their handling of 
plaintiff's injury, his subsequent medical treatment, his return to work 
at light duty after only 60 days convalescence and in the compensation 
payments ultimately accorded to him. The medical record clearly shows 
otherwise and in summary it is as follows: 
Plaintiff's injury occurred at approximately 6:45 a.m. on 
November 13, 1953. Help came and within 30 to 40 seconds plaintiff 
had been moved outside the open hearth furnace area. (R.30) 
Plaintiff was taken immediately to the Geneva Dispensary facilities 
of U. S. Steel for emergency treatment and then was taken 
immediately by ambulance to the St. Mark's Hospital in Salt Lake 
City. The hospital records and the reports of plaintiff's treating 
physicians adequately describe his convalescent period his discharge 
from the hospital and his later release for light work effective 
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January 14, 1953. (R.99) It has been contended that plaintiff was 
returned to light work too early and that his fellow employees had 
to "carry him" during the first few months following his return to 
work. This may be true; yet plaintiff has indicated that he was 
able to perform his functions with some help from his associates 
during that period of time and that by the time he was returned to 
regular work he was able to perform all of his former duties as the 
Geneva open hearth. This is important because in putting plaintiff 
back to work at the earliest time, he was able to be paid his full 
earnings including fringe benefits instead of the minimal 
compensation benefits which at that time in Utah were at the rate of 
$28,875 per week. Plaintiff's regular earnings (more than $90.00 
per week) were several times higher than that; thus it was important 
financially to him to get on the job as soon as possible. Another 
important item not to be overlooked is that the employer could have 
paid the relatively minimal worker's compensation rating accorded to 
plaintiff by the Industrial Commission and dismissed him from 
employment as being unable to handle all the responsibilities of his 
work. Instead, U. S. Steel placed him back on his regular job, 
"carried" him for approximately six months and then retained him at 
full wages and other employment benefits for another 14 years until 
plaintiff retired of his own volition at a pension which was well in 
excess of what his compensation benefits would have been during any 
period of the time in question. Moreover, there is nothing in the 
medical records to suggest that the attention and treatment accorded 
to plaintiff in connection with his industrial injury and subsequent 
convalescence was anything other than the highest type and for the 
best interests of the injured employee. 
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In summary, plaintiff did in fact receive a fair and unbiased 
hearing; his witnesses were permitted to testify at great length even as 
to their recollection of events and conversations which allegedly took 
place as many as 35 years ago as well as in areas which really were not 
pertinent to the critical issues actually involved in plaintiff's claim. 
The Administrative Law Judge in his efforts to confine that extensive 
testimony within reasonable bounds of relevance and admissibility rejected 
some proferred testimony of plaintiff and his other witnesses, some 
because of obvious irrelevancy and some because it was improper hearsay 
with respect to medical opinions, diagnoses and findings already a part of 
the medical record. Overall analysis of the record, however, shows 
clearly that plaintiff was accorded a fair and unbiased hearing with 
respect to his claim. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
In denying compensation benefits to plaintiff, the Industrial 
Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, wholly without cause 
or contrary to the one inevitable conclusion from the evidence. Rather, 
there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings and the 
record without question contains sufficient contradictory evidence to 
preclude the finding alleged by plaintiff as the "one inevitable 
conclusion'* to be drawn. Therefore, under the standard of review well 
established by this Court it is not properly within the province of the 
Court to measure the relative probabilities and disturb the findings of 
the Industrial Commission. Analysis of the record in its entirety makes 
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it clear also that plaintiff was accorded a fair and unbiased hearing and 
that there was no denial of due process. 
Accordingly respondents herein respectfully request that this Court 
affirm the decision of the Industrial Commission denying benefits as 
sought by plaintiff, Irwin G. Bunnell. 
,7TA 
DATED THIS / / day of November, 1986. 
V ^M^//^ 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
Ralph Finlayson 
Assistant Attorney General 
State of Utah 
Attorney for Respondents 
Industrial Commission of Utah and 
Second Injury Fund 
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